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A range of animal species possess an evolutionarily ancient system for representing number, 
which provides the foundation for simple arithmetical operations such as addition and numerical 
comparisons.  surprisingly,  non-human  primates  tested  in  ecologically,  highly  valid  quantity 
discrimination tasks using edible items often show a relatively low performance, suggesting 
that stimulus salience interferes with rational decision making. Here we show that quantity 
discrimination was indeed significantly enhanced when monkeys were tested with inedible items 
compared with food items (84 versus 69% correct). more importantly, when monkeys were 
tested with food, but rewarded with other food items, the accuracy was equally high (86%). 
The results indicate that the internal representation of the stimuli, not their physical quality, 
determined performance. Reward replacement apparently facilitated representation of the food 
items as signifiers for other foods, which in turn supported a higher acuity in decision making. 
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T
he ability to judge quantities is of great relevance in a vari-
ety of ecological contexts, such as predation, foraging and 
breeding1. Previous research conducted in the laboratory and 
in the field has provided compelling evidence that numerical abili-
ties are not exclusively human (for reviews see refs 2,3). Some basic 
arithmetical skills have been shown in dogs4, cats5, chicks6 and even 
mosquitofish (Gambusia holbrooki)7, suggesting that a broad array 
of species possesses an evolutionarily ancient system for represent-
ing numbers.
On the assumption that food quantity discrimination is eco-
logically highly valid, numerical skills of animals have frequently 
been examined through testing whether they are able to select the 
larger of two food quantities (relative numerousness judgment)8–11. 
A further advantage of using food quantity discrimination is that it 
avoids complicated or time-consuming training procedures, which 
must be employed when symbols are used12,13.
Somewhat  counter-intuitively,  however,  studies  using  simple 
food quantity discrimination paradigms often report performance 
at  relatively  low  levels.  Western  lowland  gorillas  (Gorilla  gorilla 
gorilla), for instance, performed at chance level in a food quantity 
discrimination task and only learned to select the larger of two food 
quantities  after  additional  training14.  Similarly,  chimpanzees  and 
orang-utans performed only at ~65% correct in a relatively simple 
food quantity discrimination task15. But why is this the case? From 
reversed reward paradigms it is known that the salience of the choice 
stimulus is a crucial factor in experiments. In this paradigm, ani-
mals have to point to the smaller quantity to obtain the larger one. 
Chimpanzees fail at this task, as they appear to be unable to inhibit 
reaching towards the larger food amount. In contrast, when symbols 
(Arabic numerals) were used, they did significantly better16.
To gain a better understanding of the factors that support accu-
rate decision making, we tested Old World monkeys in a series of 
quantity discrimination tasks. We conducted two-choice experi-
ments with olive baboons (Papio anubis) and long-tailed macaques 
(Macaca fascicularis), in which they had to discriminate between 
arrays of edible and inedible items (pebbles). We predicted that 
the monkeys would perform better when tested with inedible, that 
is, less salient items. There are two possible explanations. For one, 
the highly salient food items might impair impulse inhibition. 
Alternatively, the monkeys might have difficulties to simultane-
ously maintain two mental representations of the food items, first 
as choice stimulus and second as food reward17. To distinguish 
between these two possible explanations, we introduced a third 
condition in which the monkeys were required to discriminate 
between  food  items,  but  under  a  different  reward  contingency 
scheme: in this experiment, the monkeys were not rewarded with 
the food items they had pointed at, but with other food items of 
the same kind as the choice stimuli hidden underneath the plates 
presenting the food.
Our results revealed that the reward contingency is more impor-
tant than stimulus salience, as subjects performed equally well when 
tested  with  inedible  items  and  when  food  items  were  replaced. 
These findings suggest that the mental representation of what choice 
stimuli stand for is more important for controlling choice behaviour 
than physical appearance of the stimuli.
Results
Procedure. We tested 16 Old world monkeys (olive baboons and 
long-tailed macaques) housed at the German Primate Center in a 
two-choice paradigm. Animals were presented simultaneously with 
two different amounts (1–8 items) of edible (raisins or peanuts) or 
inedible items (pebbles). Quantities differed in magnitude from 1 
to 4 (Table 1). After the subjects made their choice by pointing at 
the desired quantity, they were rewarded either with the food items 
they had pointed at or with an amount of food equivalent to the 
amount chosen. To accustom the monkeys to the respective choice 
paradigm,  they  passed  a  short  familiarization  phase  before  the 
actual test phase of each condition began. There was no significant 
difference in performance between the two species across conditions 
(generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) analysis with Monte-
Carlo-Markov chain (MCMC) procedure: N = 16, P = 0.25, Table 2); 
therefore, results are presented for the pooled data set.
Test conditions. In the ecologically most valid ‘Food’ condition, 
food items were used as choice stimuli and as rewards; that is, the 
food items selected by the monkey were fed to her (Supplementary 
Movie 1). In this condition, the monkeys chose the larger amount 
above chance but at relatively low levels (68.8% of the choices; Fig. 1).   
When small black pebbles served as choice stimuli, and the animals 
were rewarded with the equivalent amount of food items (Pebble 
condition), subjects chose the larger amount of items significantly 
more frequently (84.4%; Fig. 1, Table 2; N = 16; post hoc test between 
these two conditions: P < 0.001).
In the ‘Food replaced’ condition, the subjects were rewarded 
with other food items hidden underneath the plates presenting the 
food. In this condition, the choice stimulus was highly salient, while 
choice stimulus and reward were separate entities, that is, the reward 
contingency was the same as in the non-food condition. If the per-
formance of the monkeys is determined by the quality of the stimu-
lus (being edible or not), they should obtain similar poor results in 
the Food and ‘Food replaced’ conditions. In contrast, if the reward 
contingency is decisive, they should do well both when tested with 
inedible items and when rewarded with other food items. In this 
condition, the subjects performed at a similar level as in the ‘Peb-
bles’ condition (see Fig. 1, post hoc test: P = 0.59) and significantly 
better than in the initial ‘Food’ condition (Supplementary Movie 2). 
They chose the larger amount in 85.6% of all trials (post hoc test: 
P < 0.001).
The performance of the animals in all three conditions was influ-
enced by the absolute magnitude of the difference between the two 
quantities as well as the ratio between the two quantities (GLMM 
analysis with MCMC procedure, Fig. 2 and Table 2).
Control conditions. To test the hypothesis that the poor perform-
ance in the Food condition was due to the changing appearance of 
the choice stimuli while the food items were given to the monkeys, 
leading to a decrease in associative strength of these stimuli, we 
added two types of control conditions. Varying the appearance of 
the stimuli by either removing all food stuffs before giving them to 
the monkeys, or by removing a pebble each time one food item was 
given to the subject did not change the pattern: monkeys were still 
Table 1 | Absolute difference and ratios of the quantities used in the experiments.
Difference 0 1 2 3 4
Combinations 1:1 2:1 (2.0) 3:1 (3.0) 4:1 (4.0) 5:1 (5.0)
2:2 3:2 (1.5) 4:2 (2.0) 5:2 (2.5) 6:2 (3.0)
3:3 4:3 (1.33) 5:3 (1.67) 6:3 (2.0) 7:3 (2.33)
4:4 5:4 (1.25) 6:4 (1.5) 7:4 (1.75) 8:4 (2.0)
Difference refers to the absolute difference between the two amounts of items used in the test. Equal amounts (difference=0) served as control condition. The numerical ratios (larger divided by 
smaller quantity) are given in parentheses.ARTICLE     
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significantly better when discriminating between different amounts 
of pebbles (86% correct) compared with food items (75% correct; 
P < 0.001).
To test whether unintentional cueing by the experimenter might 
have affected the monkeys’ performance (‘Clever Hans effect’), we 
ran an additional control. In these experiments, we used boxes with 
a lid that opened to one side and small drawers to deposit the corre-
sponding amount of food pieces. The boxes were baited by a second 
experimenter so that the first experimenter did not know how many 
pebbles were in each box. She then presented the boxes to the sub-
jects and opened the lids so that the monkeys could see the content 
of the boxes while the experimenter could not. After choosing, the 
monkeys were rewarded with the food items in the corresponding 
box. There were no significant differences in performance in rela-
tion to whether the monkeys were tested in the regular ‘Pebbles’ 
condition or in the ‘Experimenter blind’ condition (mean ± s.e.m. 
performance  in  the  regular  condition  0.81 ± 0.03  and  0.81 ± 0.02   
in the Experimenter blind condition; T = 10.5, N = 8, P = 1; exact 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test).
Discussion
In the ecologically most valid ‘Food’ condition, the monkeys chose 
the larger amount above chance but at relatively low levels. In con-
trast, subjects chose the larger amount of items significantly more 
frequently  in  the  ‘Pebbles’  condition.  Thus,  the  monkeys’  poor 
performance in the ‘Food’ condition was not due to an inability to 
discriminate between the different quantities. These results are com-
patible with the notion that highly salient stimuli impair impulse 
inhibition. Likewise, human children performed significantly better 
when symbolic representations substituted for real candies in the 
reversed-reward paradigm18, similar to the results obtained with 
chimpanzees16.
Strikingly, in the critical ‘Food replaced’ condition, the subjects 
performed at a similar level as in the ‘Pebbles’ condition and signifi-
cantly better than in the initial ‘Food’ condition. This finding refutes 
the assumption that a lack of impulse inhibition is the sole explana-
tion for the poor performance in the ‘Food’ condition (see also ref. 19   
for  alternative  explanations  of  the  reversed-reward  paradigm). 
Instead, the internal representation of the choice stimuli, not their 
physical quality, seems to be crucial for the improved performance. 
In particular, it appears that the monkeys fail to master the dual   
representation of the stimuli as choice stimulus and as food reward.
‘Dual  representation’,  that  is,  the  mental  representation  of  an 
object as well as the representation of the relation between an object 
and what it stands for, is seen as a foundation of abstract reasoning 
and symbolic understanding17. Research on children has shown that 
increasing the salience, that is, attractiveness of an object, impairs 
dual representation17. Our results suggest that in the ‘Food’ condi-
tion, our subjects failed at this dual representation, in the sense that 
they were unable to simultaneously maintain both representations 
of the items as food and as choice stimuli. In the ‘Food replaced’ 
condition, in contrast, the representation as food was diminished 
and that as signifiers for different quantities enhanced. This in turn 
supported the increase in accuracy.
Representing food items as choice stimuli can be seen as a form 
of representational redescription (RR). RR is posited as a process by 
which implicit information in the mind becomes explicit knowledge 
to the mind by recoding information from one representational for-
mat to another20. Thus, the stimuli become available to explicit rea-
soning and decision making. Clearly though, this elementary form 
of RR needs to be distinguished from relational RR as described by 
Penn and colleagues21. Relational RR involves structurally system-
atic,  rule-governed  relational  redescriptions,  and,  has  been  sug-
gested to be a distinguishing feature of humans.
Overall, the performance of our subjects was comparable with 
those of other monkey species22,23 and great apes15. Their accuracy 
was influenced by the absolute magnitude of the difference as well 
as the ratio between the two quantities. Two different mechanisms 
have been invoked to account for numerousness judgments, the 
analogue magnitude and the object-file model (for a review, see for 
example, ref. 24). The analogue magnitude model estimates large 
numerical magnitudes and is characterized through (1) less accu-
rate discrimination as the size of quantities increases and (2) as the 
ratio between the larger divided by the smaller magnitude decreases 
(Weber’s  law)25.  The  object-file  model  predicts  a  decline  in  dis-
crimination ability when more than four items are to be judged. It 
operates by keeping track of individual objects and therefore serves 
for the representation of small exact numerosities. A range of stud-
ies found support for the analogue magnitude model26,27, whereas   
others favoured the object-file model28. Our results are in line with 
the assumptions of the analogue magnitude model, because per-
formance was poor when the ratio approached 1. In contrast, the 
results are not compatible with the object-file model because sub-
jects were still very good at discriminating between large quantities, 
for example, 7 and 3 items, and showed poor performance when the 
difference was small.
Our results have two main implications. First, we demonstrate that 
quantity discrimination paradigms using food may underestimate   
Table 2 | Effects of the different predictor variables on performance.
Predictor Estimate s.e. t P MCMC
(Intercept) 0.108 0.173 0.624 0.5554
species  − 0.042 0.034  − 1.237 0.2452
Condition 0.019 0.003 7.402 0.0001
Difference 0.042 0.011 3.740 0.0001
Ratio (ln) 0.101 0.033 3.027 0.0024
Condition refers to three experimental conditions Food, Pebbles and Food replaced; difference refers to the absolute difference between the two amounts presented and ratio (ln) to the ln-transformed 
ratio between the two quantities. Parameter, s.e. (standard error) of the Estimate and t-value (test statistic) were obtained from a GLmm analysis. A monte-Carlo-markov-Chain procedure was used 
to approximate the significance levels of the parameter estimates (PmCmC).
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Figure 1 | Percent of trials in which the larger quantity was chosen in 
the different test conditions (means and standard error of means). 
Performance in the ‘Food’ condition was significantly worse than in the 
other two conditions (GLmm, N = 16 subjects; P < 0.001).ARTICLE

nATuRE CommunICATIons | DoI: 10.1038/ncomms1262
nATuRE CommunICATIons | 2:257 | DoI: 10.1038/ncomms1262 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
© 2011 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved.
the true competence of a species29. Second, we provide further insight 
into the conditions that favour rational decision making, specifically 
the effects of reducing the appetitive value of the choice stimulus. 
Taken together, our findings mirror those made with children17 and 
suggest that the basic cognitive operations that facilitate abstract 
reasoning have deep evolutionary roots (see also refs 30,31).
Methods
Subjects. Six olive baboons (Papio anubis)—four males and two females aged 
3–9 years—living in a group of 11 animals and 10 long-tailed macaques (Macaca 
fascicularis)—five males and five females aged 1–7 years—living in a group of 32 
animals were tested. The animals were housed at the German Primate Center in 
Göttingen and had access to indoor (baboons: 17 sqm, macaques: 40 sqm) and 
outdoor areas (baboons: 81sqm, macaques: 141 sqm). They were individually tested 
in their familiar indoor cages. Water was always available ad libitum and subjects 
were not food deprived for testing.
Materials. Two round white plastic plates (height 0.01 m, diameter 0.08 m) were 
baited with different amounts of food items, that is, raisins or pieces of peanuts (one 
piece corresponds to half a peanut), depending on food preferences, or little black 
pebbles (~0.01 m in diameter) and put on a sliding table in front of the subject. 
The sliding board consisted of grey polyvinylchloride (length 0.8 m, width 0.27 m, 
height 0.01 m) and was attached to a fixed polyvinylchloride table (length 0.8 m, 
width 0.38 m, height 0.01 m) by two drawer rails so that the sliding table could be 
moved horizontally. The sliding table was attached with an iron mount in front of 
a plastic panel (height 0.7 m, width 0.8 m). The plates were placed on the right and 
left side of the sliding table. Two holes (diameter 0.01 m, distance 0.3 m) in the plas-
tic panel allowed the subjects to point with their fingers at the cups. It was possible 
to set up an occluder of grey plastic (length 0.8 m, height 0.3 m, thickness 0.03 m) 
in front of the panel so that the subject was not able to watch the baiting procedure. 
All sessions were videotaped with a digital video camera (Sony DCR-HC90E).
Procedure. Before each test condition, the subjects went through a familiariza-
tion phase to accustom them to the choice paradigm used in the following test 
condition. The procedure was the same in the familiarization and the correspond-
ing test condition. The experimenter placed the two plates in the middle of the 
sliding table and baited every plate with the designated number of pieces (food or 
pebbles) behind an occluder, trying to avoid consistent arrangements of the choice 
stimuli. The occluder was removed and the experimenter waited until the animal 
paid attention (usually, they were already sitting in front of the table). Then the two 
plates were simultaneously moved in front of the two holes. After that the sliding 
table was pushed against the Plexiglas panel and the subject was allowed to choose. 
To avoid cueing the subject, the experimenter looked at the middle of the Plexiglas 
panel during the whole procedure (see also controls below). A choice was coded 
when the subject pointed with one finger to one of the locations through a hole in 
the screen. In the familiarization phase, the subjects were offered only two types 
of pairwise combinations (that is, 7 versus 1 and 8 versus 2) with 10–16 trials per 
session, one session per day. After reaching 80% correct responses within a session 
(always accomplished in the first or second session), the corresponding test session 
with different quantity combinations began. After the completion of each test  
condition, the subjects went through the new familiarization phase to introduce 
them to the paradigm of the next condition.
In the test phase, we used the following conditions: Food: The experimenter put 
up the occluder in front of the plates and baited them with the designated quantity 
of food items (raisins or peanuts). Next, the occluder was removed, the plates 
were moved in front of the two holes and the sliding table was pushed against the 
Plexiglas panel. After the subject had made its choice, it received all the food items 
on the plate it had pointed at. Pebbles: The experimenter put up the occluder and 
placed the same number of food items (raisins or peanuts) underneath the plates 
as pebbles were placed onto the plates. Then the occluder was removed, the plates 
were moved in front of the holes, the table was pushed forward and the subjects 
could choose. The monkeys then received all food items under the plate they had 
pointed at. ‘Food replaced’ condition: The experimenter put up the occluder and 
placed the same number of food items (raisins or peanuts) underneath the plates 
as food items were placed onto the plates. For all baboons, raisins were put onto 
the plates and the same number of pieces of peanuts was put underneath. We can 
exclude that they may prefer peanuts to raisins and perform better because of 
this simple explanation, as some of the baboons did not want to take the peanuts 
near the end of the sessions, so we used raisins instead. In these trials, raisins were 
placed on top of the plates as well as underneath. The baboons performed equally 
in these trials and in the rest of these sessions. However, to exclude any inferences 
from using different food kinds as choice stimuli and reward, we always used the 
same kind of food as choice stimuli and reward for the macaques, thus peanuts and 
peanuts or raisins and raisins depending on the food preferences of each subject. 
After baiting, the occluder was removed, the plates were moved in front of the 
holes, the table was pushed forward and the subject could choose. The monkeys 
then received all peanuts or raisins, respectively, under the plate they pointed at. 
The subject’s responses were initially coded live by the experimenter. To test for 
observer reliability 30% of all trials (N=740) were independently scored by a  
second coder. The inter-observer reliability was excellent (Cohen’s k: 0.98). 
Design. Initially, we started the study with the baboons. Every subject received 
four sessions per condition (one session per day; except the baboon BH that 
received only two sessions in the ‘Food replaced’ condition and the baboon MC 
that participated only in the ‘Food’ condition because of motivational problems). 
One session consisted of 20 trials resulting in 80 trials per condition per animal, 
thus a total of 240 trials per animal (but only 200 for BH, and 80 for MC). Each 
session included five numeric differences (four experimental and one control 
difference), ranging from 0 to 4. Within each numeric difference, there were four 
trials with different quantities of items used (Table 1). The sequence of the trials 
was balanced and the position of the larger quantity was counterbalanced across 
sessions. The baboons received the conditions in the following order: Food, Peb-
bles and ‘Food replaced’ condition. To exclude a learning effect across all condi-
tions we repeated the initial ‘Food’ condition at the end. The baboons performed 
equally as in the first condition (70% correct), thus learning the different quantity 
combinations could not account for the differences in their performance in the 
other conditions.
To test the consistency of the results found for the baboons, we repeated the 
test with long-tailed macaques. Every subject received two sessions (one session 
per day) in each of the three test conditions. One session consisted of 20 trials 
resulting in 40 trials per condition per animal, thus a total of 120 trials per animal. 
The design of the sessions was the same as for the baboons. To exclude any order 
effects, the order of the conditions was balanced across individuals.
The control trials were conducted to examine whether subjects exhibited a 
laterality bias, that is, going on the same side on every trial. Furthermore, in the 
control trials of the ‘Pebbles’ condition, raisins were placed only under one plate 
to discover whether the subjects used other cues such as smell, sight or cues from 
the experimenter or the baiting procedure, which they did not (47.5% correct).
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Figure 2 | Effects of relative and absolute difference between choice 
stimuli on performance. Percent of trials in which the larger amount 
was chosen (means and standard error of means) in relation to the ratio 
between the quantities presented for the three different conditions  
(a) Food, (b) Pebbles, (c) Food replaced; and in relation to the absolute 
difference between quantities (d) Food, (e) Pebbles, (f) Food replaced. 
There was a combined effect of relative and absolute difference on 
performance (GLmm, N = 16 subjects, Effect of absolute difference 
P = 0.0001, Effect of ratio P = 0.0024).ARTICLE     

nATuRE CommunICATIons | DoI: 10.1038/ncomms1262
nATuRE CommunICATIons | 2:257 | DoI: 10.1038/ncomms1262 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
© 2011 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved.
Because it was suggested that the difference in performance might be due 
to the fact that in the Food condition, the choice stimuli had lesser associa-
tive strength because they changed in appearance while the items were fed to 
the monkeys (T Dickinson, personal communication), we ran a further set of 
control experiments with eight of the macaques (two subjects were excluded 
due to motivational problems). In the first control condition, all food items 
were taken away after the subject had made their choice (‘Food away’), and 
then given to the monkeys while hidden in the experimenter’s palm. In the 
second control condition (‘Pebbles away’), we used pebbles as choice stimuli. 
After the subject made its choice, a pebble was removed each time when one 
of the food items underneath the plate was given to the monkey. To control for 
learning effects, we ran the initial ‘Food’ condition again. Overall, there was 
a slight increase in accuracy between the first and second sets of experiments 
in the ‘Food’ condition (74.1% correct). This increase was not significantly 
different (P > 0.2).
Statistics. We used a generalized linear mixed model implemented in the R 
statistical computing environment32. GLMM was implemented using the glmer 
function from the lme4 package33. We used species (2 levels), condition (3 lev-
els), absolute magnitude of the difference (4 levels) and ratio (11 levels) as fixed  
factors and subject as random factor. A MCMC procedure was used to approxi-
mate the significance levels of the parameter estimates. In the additional control 
experiments, we only tested macaques, and compared the performance in the 
‘Food away’ versus the ‘Pebbles away’ conditions. To test the effect of experi-
ence, we compared the performance of the macaques in the initial and repeated  
‘Food’ condition. 
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